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If political rhetoric were a weapon, the UK would be close to impregnable. The verbal resolve of Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer to put Britain in a state of “warfighting readiness” is admirable. Since the UK has Nato’s third highest defence budget after the US and Germany, his message should cheer allies. But there are big questions over the reality behind the rhetoric. It is not clear that Starmer’s Labour government is ready to move fast enough, on numbers and deployments, to provide genuine deterrence of the Russian threat. And its spending plans may be insufficient to achieve the transformation in readiness and capabilities to which it aspires.
The backdrop to the UK’s strategic defence review released on Monday is stark. Vladimir Putin has put Russia’s economy on to a war footing, increasing active military personnel to about 1.3mn and churning out military vehicles and arms. But Ukraine’s audacious weekend drone attack on Russian airfields as far away as Siberia shows how the conflict is transforming warfare. Donald Trump’s US, meanwhile, is insisting Europe should pay for more of its own defence.
Some of the review’s results make eminent sense. A £15bn upgrade of the UK’s nuclear deterrent is vital given questions over US readiness to use its nuclear umbrella to protect Europe, as is procuring 7,000 UK-built long-range weapons. The focus on generating a “defence dividend” by creating jobs and stimulating economic growth through raising domestic production of submarines and munitions is a wise way of trying to build public backing.
Establishing a Cyber and Electromagnetic Command along with a £1bn investment in a Digital Targeting Web reflects lessons learnt in Ukraine. But it will need to be accompanied by a comprehensive shake-up of procurement to loosen reliance on long-standing “prime” contractors and create space to source from innovative, smaller-scale defence businesses.
Yet the government is coy about how quickly force numbers will increase. Expanding the nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet to 12 will help to protect British waters and project power beyond, but will take many years. Britain must meanwhile be ready to be part of efforts to deter or defend against a Russian challenge to a Nato member that Germany’s chief of defence has suggested could come within four years. Though the review promises a “ten-fold increase in lethality” by harnessing smart technology, the target size for army numbers remains at 73,000 — still the smallest since the Napoleonic wars. It recognises a strong case for a “small increase” in regular numbers, but only when funding allows, though expanding reserve troops is seen as a priority.
The funding question underlies everything. The government has committed to increase defence spending from about 2.3 per cent of GDP to 2.5 per cent by 2027. But reaching 3 per cent remains only an “ambition” by 2034. Though military effectiveness is also a function of how well money is used, spending levels send messages about determination, to allies and adversaries alike. With Nato moving towards a new target of spending 3.5 per cent on core defence by 2032, Britain risks diluting its own weight and influence in the alliance.
Military experts warn that the 2.5 per cent target may be only enough to fill existing shortfalls, in munitions stocks and equipment, and not to achieve any real transformation of capabilities. Starmer’s government is squeezed between Labour left-wingers pushing for higher welfare spending, its own fiscal rules and the bond markets. But if he is as serious as his rhetoric suggests about UK and European defence, he should find ways to commit to hitting 3 per cent as soon as possible.
